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HOLMES ROLSTON, III 
Environmental Science and Environmental 
Advocacy: From 'Is' in Science to 'Ought' 
in Ethics 
Science and conscience have a complex, elusive relationship, nowhere better 
illustrated than in the relationship between environmental science and environ-
mental ethics. Each can inform the other to connect facts with values, descrip-
tions with prescriptions, to make advocates out of scientists and scientists out 
of advocates. Making these connections, always important, is more urgent than 
ever; indeed, the future of the planet and all those who reside on it, depends on 
joining science and conscience. 
Environmental science and environmental ethics 
An environmental ethic is foolish not to be informed by the best environmental 
science available. The success of an environmental policy does not depend 
merely on the cultural values, the policy preferences, or the social institutions 
that drive the human actors. Success depends on coupling such prescriptive 
values with an environmental science that is descriptively accurate and opera-
tionally competent. American culture greatly values the bald eagle as a na-
tional symbol. But we cannot save this endangered species unless we know 
what eagles eat, where they migrate, where they nest, and what pesticides and 
herbicides build up in the food chain and end up toxic to the eagles. Getting 
these facts right, and making them available for decisions, is the first responsi-
bility of environmental scientists. 
In this sense an environmental ethic, more than traditional ethics, needs to 
escape cultural relativism. True, cultures have some options in what they value 
in nature; Americans chose the eagle as a symbol, the British the lion. It is 
equally true that nature exists outside culture; wild nature is what it is regard-
less of either environmental science or environmental ethics. Environmental 
science must communicate to environmental ethics the parameters within 
which ethics must work. So environmental ethics must place at least one foot 
outside culture. The way the world ought to be depends on the way it can be, 
and that depends on the way it is. 
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This becomes problematic when a socially-held value drives a mistaken en-
vironmental science. We have to be cautious about thinking that science is 
canonical, for we know that science changes, sometimes rapidly. Anyone 
versed in the history of science is impressed with the depth of these changes. 
There is no reason to think that the science of tomorrow will not be different 
from the science of today. Sometimes these misperceptions of the way nature 
works are driven by social values. Nor is it easy to say, when perceptions 
change, whether new values permit new perceptions or newfound perceptions 
generate new values. 
The U. S. Forest Service for the first half of this century designed and con-
ducted research projects that proved its claim that fire was a destructive agent 
in forests and should be suppressed.1 Fire policy followed accordingly. This 
claim about fire in forests was largely driven by the economic value of timber. 
Over the last thirty years we have revalued fire. One ought to let natural fires 
burn; one ought to set prescribed fires. What brought about the changed ethic? 
Better environmental science. A skeptic may say that today we only have dif-
ferent social values driving a different environmental science, and another 
mis-perception. But if so, the challenge remains; we cannot form a 
prescriptive environmental ethic about fire until we are descriptively 
informed about fire ecology. What culture ought to do depends on what is the 
case in nature. 
Descriptive 'Is' and Evaluative 'Ought' 
Environmental science informs environmental ethics in more subtle ways. 
Consider some descriptive categories used of ecosystems: the order, stability, 
and diversity in these biotic communities. We describe their interdependence, 
or speak of their health or integrity, perhaps of their resilience or efficiency. We 
describe the adapted fit that organisms have in their niches, the roles they play. 
We describe an ecosystem as flourishing. Strictly interpreted, these are just 
descriptive terms; and yet often they are already quasi-evaluative terms. Order, 
stability, diversity, interdependence, fitness, health, integrity are values 
too–perhaps not always so but often enough that by the time the 
descriptions of ecosystems are in, some values are already there. They are 
among the givens, not the options. 
Matters might have been different. If the descriptions were of disorder, in-
stability, impoverished numbers of species, misfits, pathological relationships 
and self-degrading systems, we should have to make other judgments. And, 
sometimes this seems to be so in nature. Still, often the seeming disvalues, on 
deeper appreciation, are misperceptions or half truths. As just noted, we long 
thought that fire was a disvalue. Earlier, there was a debate about whether 
ecosystems were real communities or merely fortuitous aggregations;  and the 
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facts here affect our value judgments. In the last decade debate has increased 
about the extent to which the evolutionary history of ecosystems is contingent, 
even chaotic, and the answers will affect our value judgments. If speciation is 
only by random accident and drift, not really involving adapted fit and biolog-
ical achievement, we might value the diversity of species less. 
The biological sciences, including the ecological sciences, do describe what 
is the case in nature and enable us better to appreciate and conserve it. Science 
does this better than folklore, mythology, and, often, than religious beliefs. 
These natural events are not processes that go on in the human mind, they are 
not at our option or preference, but they are objectively there in the world, and 
we have to discover them, not choose or assign them. We conserve natural 
things because they are useful, but also because we marvel at the intricacy, 
diversity, complexity, beauty, order, natural history, at the creativity present in 
nature. So we have both to take care that our ethics is informed by the facts 
about nature, and, since these facts reform our value judgement, we have to 
take care that our science is sensitizing us to the values there. Bad science can 
result in bad ethics. Good science is a prerequisite for good ethics. 
Ecologists and a sustainable biosphere 
Ethics can sometimes inform science. We will consider two cases, both from 
professional scientific societies, one from ecology, which has traditionally 
been reckoned among the pure sciences, one from forestry, traditionally one of 
the applied sciences. 
A scientific group, the Ecological Society of America, has advocated re-
search and policy that will result in a sustainable biosphere. The ESA, in a 
document that it calls "unprecedented in its scope and objectives" sets a policy 
"to define research priorities for ecology in the closing decade of the 20th 
Century." Those priorities are, in brief, a "sustainable biosphere".2 "Achieving 
a sustainable biosphere is the single most important task facing humankind 
today".3 "There is no higher priority for research".4 
Here we have, right up front, a value-driven science: one ought to sustain the 
biosphere. This might be, vis-a-vis nature, either a prudential or a moral ought, 
or both. Such advocacy might, for an individual human agent, be a prudential 
ought, since every human has a self-interested stake in the condition of the 
environment that one inhabits. But such policy must be, vis-a-vis other hu-
mans, a moral ought, since other humans are helped or hurt by the condition of 
the environment 
Further, beyond human welfare, this policy statement can involve—indeed 
the ESA statement everywhere allows for—a caring for the biosphere because 
it has value in itself.  The ESA report is nicely comprehensive (some would say 
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deliberately evasive) about the mix of anthropocentric and intrinsic natural 
values. A research priority is to understand "how to manage ecological sys-
tems so that they can remain productive to support natural processes and the 
human population." Research is "for the specific purpose of prescribing the 
most effective restoration and management strategies to ensure the continu-
ance of Earth's ecological systems".5 
So there are multiple levels of value at stake here. One can advocate both 
saving values that are intrinsic in these ecosystems, independently there 
whether or not humans are interested, and also advocate values instrumental to 
humans who depend on these ecosystems. Scientists and ethicists can take it 
either way, or both ways. But there is only one way to interpret the word 
"prescribe." That is an ethical word driving the agenda of science. This is 
mission-oriented research. 
Notice that the priority set is not "sustainable development," not that set at 
the Earth Summit, at least not exactly. The focus is different. The United Na-
tions World Commission on Environment and Development makes sustainable 
development a first priority. The Brundtland Report gives "overriding priority"  
to the needs of the poor and to growth, within the limits and powers of technol-
ogy and social organization, growth that can be environmentally sustained.6 
The Ecological Society of America advocates, rather, a caring for nature that 
sustains the biosphere, and any sustainable human development must come 
within those more fundamental parameters. The report laments, in fact, an 
emphasis on sustainable commodities, sustainable agricultural and industrial 
production. "Much of the current research focuses on commodity-based man-
aged systems, with little attention paid to the sustainability of natural ecosys-
tems whose goods and services currently lack a market value".7 
The Commission on Life Sciences of the National Academy of Science, in a 
position statement, was more humanistic about it: "We must... restructure our 
scientific objectives toward the goal of assisting human societies to preserve 
their global bio-geological life support systems".8 Humans care about nature 
only insofar as it is their life support.  Still, the NAS position is value-laden 
and moral. In this imperative restructuring, the NAS "must" is prudential from 
the collective viewpoint of humans, but it is moral from the viewpoint of 
those scientists urged to restructure their objectives. 
A forest ethic and sustainable forestry 
Foresters  typically think of themselves as doing  applied science,  while ecolo- 
gists may do pure science. The Society of American Foresters has recently 
adopted a new land ethic statement. Termed a "land ethic canon," the statement 
was  approved by 77% of those voting by mail  referendum ballot in the fall of 
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1992, about 6,000 of the 12,000 members of the Society; or a 3 to 1 margin. 
The new ethic reads, with the new language underlined: 
Stewardship of the land is the cornerstone of the forestry profession. The purpose 
of these Canons is to govern the professional conduct of members of the Society of 
American Foresters in their relations with the land, the public, their employers, 
including clients, and each other as provided in Article VIII of the Society's 
Constitution. Compliance with these Canons demonstrates our respect for the 
land and our commitment to the wise management of ecosystems, and ensures just 
and  honorable professional  and human relationships,  mutual confidence and re- 
spect, and competent service to society. (Preamble) 
A member will advocate and practice land management consistent with eco- 
logically sound principles. (Canon I)9 
Considerable debate underlies these carefully chosen words. Raymond S. 
Craig, chair of the SAP Land Ethic Task Force, explains, "Most foresters 
aren't comfortable with espousing philosophy! We don't usually use words 
like "respect" and "love" in our everyday work.Yet foresters invariably use 
these words when asked to explain how they feel about the forest, particularly 
when discussing the reasons that led them to choose this profession." "The 
challenge lies in expanding our role beyond commodity production to embrace 
management in consideration of other values.9  Foresters now follow the im-
perative of Aldo Leopold "to value all components of ecosystems, without 
regard to their usefulness to humans, because all components have intrinsic 
value. As we manage lands, those values must be considered in our deci-
sions".10  Craig expressed his hope that "the land ethic would permeate the soul 
of the [SAF] organization. It becomes a part of all that professional foresters 
represent and what they say".11 
The foresters, interestingly, considered and withdrew a proposed canon that 
read "A member will manage land for long-term sustainability using ecologi-
cally sound principles"12 There were repeated objections that what was to be 
sustained was unclear. It might mean sustainable timber production, a com-
modity; or it might mean sustainable ecosystems. Many felt that forestry had 
too long been rhetorically committed to sustainable timber production (often 
more rhetoric than actuality), and unless what was sustained was more than 
commodity production, the land ethic would be undermined. Presumably the 
forester's ethical respect for the land will require that they sustain forest eco-
systems as biotic communities, not simply as commercial commodities. The 
foresters have also advocated biodiversity: "Maintaining biological diversity is 
essential for sustaining the production of both commodity and non-commodity 
values from forests".13 Surely too, research done henceforth in forestry will 
need to conform to this land ethic prescribed to all foresters. 
So we see that ethics can inform both ecological science and forest science, 
both pure and applied. That idea stands in contrast to an older account. Con- 
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sider a statement by Robert G. Lee, made in the context of whether forest 
scientists should advocate sustaining forests by natural fires: 
We step out of our role as scientists when we prescribe actions, since actions are 
always goal directed and, hence, involve uncritical commitments to values and 
beliefs. We forfeit our role as scientists when we advocate either fire exclusion or 
allowing fires to burn as they would under 'natural' conditions. Scientists are 
most scholarly when they explain cause and effect processes, define management 
alternatives, or predict the consequences of alternative management actions, and 
leave prescription to citizen actions and public officials.14 
Ecologists and foresters are now of a different opinion, namely, that scientists 
do have a role in advocating policy. 
Environmental health and integrity 
Ecologists and foresters come to the conviction, based on their science, that 
natural systems have some kind of ecological integrity or health, which are 
combined fact/value words. Aldo Leopold, himself both a forester and an ecol- 
ogist, urged our "responsibility for the health of the land".15 The difference 
between integrity and health is said by some to be that integrity applies to 
pristine systems, while human-modified systems can be healthy with various 
artificial modifications and substitutions.  Many others ignore this distintinc- 
tion and use the terms more or less interchangeably. 
Ecology is, in a way, like medical science. Ecologists are responsible for 
environmental health, which is really another form of public health. Health is 
not just a skin-in matter, it is a skin-out matter: One cannot be healthy in a sick 
environment.  Health is something it is easy to advocate and the criteria for 
health seem to be scientific. No one wants to be against sustainability, or to 
degrade life-support systems. 
There are two possible problems with advocating health. One complaint is 
that the idea of health is too vague to have any operational value. Sustainablity 
too, along with health, is another idea that is so fundamental, so broad, so basic 
that neither really contains any empirical claims, but they both serve as an 
umbrella that covers all the interesting debates. Another problem is that 
"health" is being borrowed from medical environments, and possibly "health" 
is too organismic a term to extrapolate to biotic communities. Meanwhile, the 
concept works in medicine, even though health and disease are notoriously 
hard to define. Perhaps we need some analogous therapeutic concept in eco-
logical science. 
We use many paradigmatic concepts to conserve values: justice, freedom, 
love, democracy, rights, or privacy. These are system-wide words, symbols 
that orient us—open concepts, not always subject to calculus, but that does not 
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mean they are under no logical control. They give general directions. Health is 
like that; it is a general norm, and yet there are quite specific tests for this or 
that unhealthy condition. Ecologists advocate healthy ecosystems, and this 
may mean setting a limit of how many parts per million of dissolved oxygen is 
the minimum for that river. Health is closely related to sustainability. Neither 
human nor animal and plant life can be long sustained unless there is ongoing 
health. 
Biological integrity is an ecosystem's ability to maintain "a balanced, 
integrated, adaptive community of organisms having a species composition, 
diversity,  and  functional  organization  comparable  to  that  of the 
region".16 Biological health is the state in which the genetic potentials of an 
ecosystem's member species are realized as organisms flourish in their niches, 
with the integrated systemic condition dynamic and stable. The systemic ca-
pacity for self-repair when perturbed is present. "An ecological system is 
healthy and free from 'distress syndrome' if it is stable and sustainable—that 
is, if it is active and maintains its organization and autonomy over time and is 
resilient to stress."17 
Descriptively, the ecosystem is functioning well; there is cycling and re-
cycling of energy and materials. The member organisms are flourishing as 
interrelated fits in their niches. The system is spontaneously self-organizing in 
the fundamental processes of climate, hydrology, photosynthesis. There is re-
sistance to, and resilience after, perturbation. The system does not have con-
stantly to be doctored. "Health is the capacity of the land for self-renewal. 
Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity".18 In other 
words, ecosystem health and integrity is the key to its sustainability. If it is 
appropriate for physicians to promote health, then it is appropriate for ecolo- 
gists and foresters to promote sustainability. 
There is a problematic disanalogy, however, as yet insufficiently analysed. A 
person prefers bodily natural health. We repair breakdowns, but we do not 
rebuild the healthy body. We only go to doctors when we are sick. By contrast, 
we do not want entirely natural ecosystems, and nothing more. If there is to be 
any culture at all, especially a modern culture, we want to transform wild 
nature into rebuilt environments. We constantly labor to make something better 
out of wild nature, not just fixing something sick. The health or integrity of 
wild nature has to be sacrificed in the interests of developing a culture. A 
flourishing culture requires revamping much of wild nature. We regularly call 
on science and technology to help us achieve these goals. Perhaps neither 
ecologists nor foresters have any special competence in evaluating what re-
building of nature a culture desires, and how far the integrity of wild nature 
should be sacrificed to achieve this. 
However, if this goes too far, then the natural system can collapse. Scientists 
do have the responsibility to help us identify a pristine biological integrity, 
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present ideally in wilderness areas, hopefully in protected areas, and to con-
trast that with a culturally modified biological health, which we will try to 
maintain all over the landscape. This is land health, even when pristine integ-
rity has been compromised in order to support various forms of cultural integ-
rity. Without this kind and degree of land health, neither nature nor culture can 
be sustained. 
Meanwhile, if these ideas can be made reasonably clear; then the connection 
between science and ethics is that environmental science describes land health 
or integrity, and environmental ethics advocates maintaining it. Here the scien-
tist and the ethicist need not be two persons. One person can be both; a scien-
tist ought to advocate land health. Any ethicist who advocates land health will 
need to learn enough science to know what he or she is talking about. 
Stability and sustainability in a land ethic 
Half a century ago, Aldo Leopold joined ecological science with an ecological 
conscience, when he urged, most famously, "A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong 
when it tends otherwise".19 That proved a seminal claim, both for biologists 
and philosophers, because biologists often thought that their science was or 
ought to be value free, and philosophers have often thought that one commits a 
naturalistic fallacy to move from what is the case in science to what ought to be 
in ethics. Still, Leopold seemed to discover characteristics in biotic communi-
ties that served as criteria for an ethic. 
Indeed, in Leopold, there was hardly any derivation of ought from is; rather, 
the two seemed to arise together. Ecological description found unity, harmony, 
interdependence, stability, integrity, and so forth, and these are valuationally 
endorsed. They are found, to some extent, because one searched with a dispo-
sition to value order, harmony, stability, unity. But the ecological description 
did not merely mirror or confirm previously existing values. It informed them, 
and Leopold found that the character, the empirical content of order, harmony, 
stability, is drawn from, no less than brought to nature. 
There seemed to be a marriage and mutual transformation of ecological 
description and evaluation where an ought was discovered simultaneously 
with an is. One progressed from descriptions of fauna and flora, cycles and 
pyramids, stability and dynamism, to intricacy, planetary opulence and inter-
dependence, with oppositions in counterpoint and synthesis, reaching at length 
beauty and goodness. It seemed difficult to tell where the natural facts left off 
and the natural values that one ought to conserve appeared. 
But that was half a century ago. Now we face a new century. Where do we 
stand relating environmental science and environmental ethics? There are two 
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important challenges that, if not understood correctly, can threaten both the 
science and the ethics. Natural systems, it is often now claimed, do not have 
the stability earlier claimed for them. They change, and, even more problemat-
ically, these changes are contingent. This threatens first the science, and 
after that the ethics that was hoped to be justified by the science. 
Ecology has proved a troublesome science in which to find any unified the-
ory; indeed, it has proved troublesome even to find universally applicable laws. 
Many doubt that there are anywhere in biology laws of the kind so impres-
sively found in physics and chemistry, but at least in organismic biology there 
are regularities and trends enough to build a science, and so molecular biology 
and genetics have developed into impressive sciences. But ecology has resisted 
grand theory and many of its leading ideas—such as succession, or climax 
species, or trophic levels, or the diversity-stability hypothesis, or capstone spe-
cies, or carrying capacity, or feedback loops for stability, or fire ecology—have 
proved piecemeal and partial, hardly universal laws, only local generalizations 
that sometimes have exceptions. 
Chaos has come into vogue in science, and there can almost be a science of 
chaos, where impressive regularities arise within chaotic processes. One does 
have to have dependable regularities enough to make a science of these, and in 
ecology many now think that these are hard to come by. Some ecologists insist 
that ecosystem histories are more random walks than they are stable dyna-
misms. Donald Worcester says, "Over the past two decades the field of ecology 
has pretty well demolished ... a world of ecosystems tending toward equilib-
rium, leaving us with no model of development for human society to 
emulate. ... Nature, we are now told, should be regarded as a landscape of 
patches of all sizes, textures, and colors, changing continually through time 
and space, responding to an unceasing barage of perturbations."20 That 
doesn't sound like much stability. If not, on what basis is science to advocate 
sustainability? 
Again, we are going to need to get the descriptions right to know what 
prescriptions to make. Ecosystems are dynamic systems involving both order 
and novelty. The stability of ecosystems is not a frozen sameness. Ecosystems 
undergo successions, periodically rejuvenated—disturbance, early, middle, 
and late succession, climax. But, depending on how frequent and extensive 
these interruptions are, succession can be more ideal than real. If often enough 
interrupted, ecosystems wander though contingencies as much as do they 
steadily develop. Both can be true. Ecosystems may be stable within bounds, 
within which they wander, but, when unusual disturbances come, with enough 
amplitude to knock them out of bounds, they are displaced beyond recovery of 
their former patterns. Then they wander until they settle into some new equi-
librium. 
The idea of an ecosystem being temporarily displaced from its equilibrium 
by some upset (a hurricane, a fire), to which equilibrium it soon returns, is only 
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a half truth. There other possible responses; the ecosystem may restructure 
after the upset; the upset may hasten historical trends that were already at work 
more slowly, or it may introduce new historical directions, if it permits some 
species to get established that would not otherwise have done so. There is not 
some one and only one stable state that an ecosystem should always have. 
Ecosystems are always on historical trajectory. 
But ecosystemic stability is at least a half truth. Ecosystemic stability (like 
complexity, diversity, integrity, health) is both a general paradigm and a meas-
urable characteristic at particular levels. Some ecosystems may be constant, 
that is, little changing in some dimensions. Temperatures change rather little in 
some tropical forests; species richness or evenness may remain about the 
same. Ecosystems may be persistent, that is, last long periods of time with 
little changes in species and their interrelationships. Ecosystems may have 
inertia, that is, resist external perturbations; this will probably be because of 
negative feedback loops that dampen changes. 
Ecosystems may be elastic; if so, they return rapidly to their former state 
after pertubation. This may depend on the amplitude of the pertubation, both 
the area disturbed and the degree of displacement. Ecosystems sometimes 
have cyclic stability, that is, oscillate periodically about some central mean, or 
they may have trajectory stability, that is, move steadily along routes of suc-
cession or, more vector-like, have historical tendencies. A trajectory stability 
recognizes that some ecosystems may be steadily changing over time.21 Eco-
systems may be cycles on cycles at close hand but really, over longer times, 
spirals that stretch out directionally (like a stretched-out spring). Scientists can 
get numbers for some of these dimensions of stability. 
Against the sheer random walk hypothesis, there is no doubt that ecosys-
tems are full of cybernetic subsystems, species lineages that transmit informa-
tion over time. Coded in the genetics and expressed in the coping behaviors of 
its member species, ecosystems will have the capacity to adjust to interrup-
tions that come often enough to be remembered in the genetic memory. If 
climatic changes, or novel species invasions, are not too overwhelming, we 
expect that ecosystems that have long persisted will persist longer. Nothing 
succeeds like success. 
Stability and historical change have to be scaled. The time frames of some 
ecological changes are the familiar cycles of spring, summer, winter, fall or 
rainy and dry season. Also, there are sometimes longer cycles. The burned 
forests of Yellowstone National Park are regenerating, but only our great 
grandchildren will see them back like they were a decade ago. On a big enough 
scale, ecology meets evolution. Or, perhaps we should say, the evolution going 
on all the time becomes evident. The cycles of ecology become the spirals of 
evolutionary history. So historical change is made possible by stability that 
supports variation. 
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Meanwhile, on the scale of deep time, some processes continue on and on, 
so that the perennial givens—wind and rain, soil and photosynthesis, life and 
death and life renewed—can seem, and indeed are, quite stable. Species sur-
vive for millions of years. The water cycles back, century after century. The 
farmer plants crops another season. Forests do regenerate, as Yellowstone will; 
it is already happening. The oxygen content of the atmosphere stays the same. 
There is a great deal of reliability in ecosystems, which we do want to sustain. 
There have been endless changes in evolutionary history; nevertheless there 
has been a sustainable biosphere for thousands of millions of years. 
Human life is lived on the scale of ecology, long though these scales some-
times are. A human life is eight decades, more or less; those of our immediate 
experience include our grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, cover-
ing a century and a half. On these scales there is considerable stability in 
nature, and we do not want to introduce cultural changes that the natural dyna-
mism of ecosystems cannot absorb. Leopold uses the word "stability" in the 
time frame of land-use planning. On that scale, nature typically does have a 
reliable stability, and farmers, scientists, advocates, and everybody else ought 
to figure in these perennial givens. 
Our national histories cover many centuries, during which we must be pre-
pared for natural systems to change. Even national histories hardly reach the 
scale of major evolutionary changes (several thousand years), so scientists and 
advocates need not worry overmuch about stability at that scale. Meanwhile, 
we humans, in this century and in the next, very much threaten these long-
standing natural processes that have yielded a sustainable biosphere for so 
many millennia.  Why is it not a responsibility of scientists, as much as ethi- 
cists, to be concerned about these threats? 
Earth ethics: sustaining and managing the planet 
Facts and values have concerned philosophers and scientists for many centu-
ries. The novelty and urgency in our century, and increasingly in the century 
ahead, is moving these issues to the global level. Thanks to both the Enlighten-
ment and Western science, we humans today now know more about nature 
than did any previous generation of humans; we also have more power to affect 
natural forces at the global level than have humans ever before. Willy-nilly, we 
humans have to think of ourselves as planetary managers and sustainers. In 
earlier times, one might have preferred the words "dominion" or 'trustee," 
"overseer" or "steward," residual from the classical religious tradition. In our 
more secular epoch, the words that have come to replace these, are "sustaina- 
bility" and "management." The Biblical vision of humans placed on Earth to 
have dominion over, to tend and to keep the garden Eden, no longer seems 
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quaint and prescientific. The old vision returns in a de-mythologized, post-
modern form. 
William Clark writes, in a Scientific American issue devoted to Managing 
Planet Earth, "We live in an era characterized by syndromes of global 
change. ... As we move from merely causing these syndromes to managing 
them consciously, two central questions must be asked? What kind of planet 
do we want? What kind of planet can we get?".22 Adam and Eve were hardly so 
bold. Those questions do not preclude nonanthropocentric answers; but 
they strongly suggest that humans are being asked what they want out of the 
planet; and the planetary managers, assisted by their scientists, will figure out 
how to get it. The root of "manage" is the Latin "manus," hand. Humans will 
handle the place. This can even mean that Homo sapiens is the professional 
manager of an otherwise valueless world. Nature is to be harnessed to human needs. 
This managing the planet begins to sound like the end of nature, the re-
placement of spontaneous nature with a new epoch of deliberate control, hu-
manizing the Earth. Perhaps there looms before us what some call, rather dra- 
matically, the end of nature"23). In the twenty-first century, there will only be 
nature that is managed, not spontaneous nature. Let's face the facts, the tech-
nocrat will insist. Humans now control 40% of the planet's land-based primary 
net photosynthetic productivity.24 The World Bank found that 35% of the 
Earth's land has now become degraded.25 Surely, our only option is to inter-
vene more intelligently—to manage the planet 
Well, yes, no one wishes to oppose intelligent management, and yet one 
does have to ask what kind of planet do we want, as Clark puts it. In an Earth 
ethics, ought humans to place themselves at the center of values, claiming 
management of the whole in their human self-interest? Placing one's own spe-
cies at the center, a biologist may insist, is just what goes on in the woods; 
warblers take a warblo-centric point of view; spruce push only to make more 
spruce. Humans are unlikely not to act in their own intelligent and prudential 
self-interest 
Other biologists will also insist, however, that the system takes no such 
particular points of view but generates myriads of such kinds. If they wish also 
to recall the classical religious vision, God bade the Earth to produce its 
swarms of creatures, and found this to be very good, even before God turned to 
make humans. Humans will no doubt have to manage the planet so as to meet 
their own needs, but there is more to be said. Humans are the only species who 
can see an ecosystem for what it objectively is, a community of interconnected 
species, each with a niche and a role to play, and integrated into a community 
of life. Conservation biologists can and ought to help humans save their life 
support system, Earth as our home planet. They also have a larger responsibil-
ity of showing how humans can and ought to take their place in the global 
community of life.  Maybe that too is what is meant by dominion and keeping 
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the earth, or, in the more current vocabulary, something that the postmodern 
planetary managers ought to sustain. 
Perhaps we can put it this way. In addition to saving fauna and flora, conser-
vation biologists can and ought to save humans by daily rescuing them from 
falling into a beguiling anthropocentrism which is too human-centered, too 
proud. They can do this through helping humans to have perennial contact with 
the primeval biological and geomorphic givens. Conservation biology should 
liberate us from a narrow humanism and help us gain fuller humanity by tran-
scending merely human interests. Biologists will be at their best when they can 
help to reform human character in encounters with a value-laden world. 
Ethical conservatives, in the humanist sense, will say that the Earth and its 
biosphere is of value only because Earth contributes to human experiences. 
They will put humans at the center of concerns. That is the Enlightenment 
heritage, its vision becoming reality with the power of modern science. But 
that mistakes the last chapter, perhaps the climax, for the whole story, as 
though there were no concerns except those in center focus. Humans count 
enough to have the right to flourish here on Earth, but not so much that we 
have the right to transform the planet into nothing but our resource, not at 
least without a burden of proof that there is an overriding cultural gain. The 
ethical conservative in the ecological sense sees that the stability, integrity, 
and beauty of biotic communities on Earth is what is most fundamentally to 
be sustained, with human cultures in harmonious relationships with such 
life-supporting nature. 
The planetary Earth system is, in fact, where the real ability to produce 
value arises. Value does not arise, as we in our anthropocentric arrogance 
might say, only when we humans arrive on the scene to assign and project our 
values there. Making the fallacy of misplaced values, this is as though a person 
were to dip water at a fountain of life, watering a lush land, then value the 
water and the fountain instrumentally, and comment that nothing was of value 
until I came. It is like finding a goose that lays golden eggs and valuing the 
eggs but not the goose. 
We have on our hand the results of millennia of evolutionary natural history, 
some five to ten million species. In the Biblical vocabulary, these are the 
''swarms of creatures" that the Earth brought forth. That description of what 
has happened generates the conviction that the life story ought to continue, and 
this moves biology into ethics. True, this is not any ordinary logical deduction 
or scientific law from which one derives ethics. All we can do is tell the epic 
story—eucaryotes, trilobites, dinosaurs, primates, persons who are scientists, 
ethicists, conservation biologists, environmental advocates—and the drama, if 
true to life, may prove enough to justify it. There will be no inductive, deduc-
tive or other scientific inference to the conviction that we ought to respect life. 
But one would be unreasonable indeed to deny this. 
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Biologists here, scientists though they may be, cannot refuse to become 
philosophical, ethical, even religious. They find something sacred about life, 
in, with, and under the secular. The line between respect and reverence for life 
is crossed over, somewhere in the zone of the sublime. One of the world's most 
eminent biologists, Ernst Mayr, says: "Virtually all biologists are religious, in 
the deeper sense of the word, even though it may be a religion without revela-
tion. ... The unknown and maybe unknowable instills in us a sense of humility 
and awe."26 Such a thoughtful biologist is urged on to a sense of respect for 
nature. "And if one is a truly thinking biologist, one has a feeling of responsi-
bility for nature, as reflected by much of the conservation movement".27 
The chief threat that such creative processes face today is Homo sapiens. 
Indeed, this is the greatest threat that the speciating processes have faced in the 
history of the planet. So the "wise species" faces an enormous responsibility. 
Managing the otherwise valueless planet is not an apt paradigm, besides which 
all other conservation ideologies are backward romanticisms. Why not, for 
instance, think of ourselves as residents who are learning the logic of our home 
community, or as moral overseers trying to optimize both the cultural and the 
natural values on the planet? Is our only relationship to nature one of engineer-
ing it for the better? Perhaps what is as much to be managed is this 
earth-eating, managerial mentality that has caused the environmental crisis 
in the first place. 
Humans cannot simply take nature ready to hand, but we must remake it for 
the supporting of agriculture, industry, culture. After that, perhaps, on the 
larger planetary scales, it is better to build our cultures in intelligent harmony 
with the way the world is already built, rather than take control and rebuild the 
planet by ourselves and for ourselves. "Hands" (the root of "manage", again) 
are also for holding in loving care. Scientists have as much responsibility for 
teaching us how to hold Earth in loving care as they do for giving us power for 
development 
Earth is really the relevant survival unit, and, if so, we need an Earth ethics, 
above all else. From this viewpoint, we do not face the end of nature, replaced 
by culture. Sustainable development can be a good thing; without it there will 
be increased suffering in the future. Of that there is little doubt. But if we ask 
about our children and grandchildren, the potential threats that they face are 
many; the one most likely to become real is a degraded natural environment 
Vital conservation biology 
The fundamental reason that ethics is entwined with biological science is that 
biology places because it finds values at the core of life. Biology can mean two 
things: Biology is the scientific study that is undertaken by humans; this takes 
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place on field trips and in laboratories, is written up in journals and books, and 
taught to students. But biology is also what goes on out there in nature. That 
biology does not go on in human minds; it went on in the days of the dinosaurs 
and continues today. Earth is the planet remarkable for its biology, the only 
biosphere we know in the universe. 
The logic of life in both kinds of biology, the bio-logic, is conservation 
biology. Conservation biology was not invented by human scientists who be-
came environmentalist advocates. Conservation biology began billions of 
years ago, for the essential genius of life is its conservation, life preserved in 
the midst of its perpetual perishing. Something has to be, and has been, con-
served across evolutionary natural history in ways radically different from any 
conservation in physics or chemistry. A genetic set is a set of conservation 
molecules. An organism can survive only so far as it has structures, behaviors, 
metabolisms, skills that have survival value, coded in its genes and used for 
coping in life. Biology without conservation is death and extinction. So values 
are integral to the logic of biology. 
In biology much is vital, and vital is a value word as readily as it is a meta-
bolic word. There is a long-standing ethical tradition of respect for life; the 
difference in ecology is that the focus moves to life at the more comprehensive 
levels of the ecosystem, and to the protection of the diversity that is the herit-
age of evolutionary natural history. Humans have arrived on this world scene 
quite lately, and only more lately still have humane come to jeopardize this 
panorama of flourishing life. In the face of such jeopardy, humans, both biolo-
gists and ethicists, come to value life and to find its conservation imperative. 
Humans are the creatures with a conscience; we ought to value human life and 
wild life. A biologist who does not respect life is just as much a contradiction 
in terms as is an ethicist who does not. That joins forever environmental sci-
ence and environmental ethics. 
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